

INR ANALYSIS

Human Rights in Latin America

Two trends have placed the United States and some key Latin American countries on an apparent collision course:

- the tendency of leaders in those countries to employ repressive, authoritarian tactics because they believe (a) that they are fighting to preserve their way of life against subversive forces often supported from abroad, and (b) that traditional democratic institutions have not provided the strong government necessary for rapid modernization and long-term stability; and
- a heightened concern in the US about what constitutes an appropriate relationship between the USG and governments that do not meet internationally recognized standards in protecting the human rights of their citizens.

Criticized by public and private spokesmen from the US and other nations and confronted with US aid cutoffs in the cases of Chile and Uruguay, the military rulers of Latin America's Southern Cone countries have displayed a sense of isolation and an ambivalent attitude toward the US. Because they perceive the US as the leader of the Western world and its preeminent anti-communist spokesman, they are disappointed and defensive when criticized by the US for pursuing what they believe is essentially an anti-communist battle. Southern Cone nations are attempting to counter the sense of diplomatic isolation, promote economic development, and improve their counterterrorist capacity through closer regional cooperation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of the human rights situation in Latin America and the potential effects of various international approaches to it.

The Latin American Problem

The Latin American dimensions of this problem spring from evolution in two areas--the need for government suffi-

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ciently strong to ensure social and economic progress and the increasingly widespread resort to terrorism as a form of political activism in the 1970's.

Strong government. Several Latin American nations are marked simultaneously by a pervasive drive for development and increasing constraints on individual rights--constraints that sometimes include brutal violations of fundamental human rights. Governments under pressure to promote rapid economic and social modernization have tended to resolve the problem of balancing freedom and authority by leaning substantially on the side of the latter. The result has been a trend toward authoritarianism both of the right and of the left.

On the right, this trend is manifested in the proliferation of conservative military governments; a development that reflects the fact that the military is often the sole national institution with sufficient power and cohesion to impose order and make and carry out decisions. Military rulers tend to assume power with, or subsequently evolve, rather rigid developmental policies, whether on the right (Chile, Argentina) or left (Peru under Velasco, 1968-75), and they are willing to sacrifice civil and political rights in the name of higher developmental goals. In their view--and it is one shared by many civilians--traditional democratic institutions have proven too weak and/or corrupt to mediate conflict between classes and interest groups, or to respond rapidly and rationally to the imperatives of the developmental process. Making and implementing tough economic decisions are tasks accomplished more easily and effectively, they believe, within an authoritarian than an open, pluralistic and competitive framework. Furthermore, they argue, it is important that such decisions be made by those likely to place national above sectoral or individual interests; i.e., the armed forces.

Authoritarianism of the left appears less frequently in Latin America, but Peru's military regime under General Velasco (1968-75), Mexico's single-party, civilian-dominated structure, and Cuba's combination of civil-military rule demonstrate the variety of approaches that have been attempted. Several significant differences between authoritarian regimes of the left and right might be examined, but insofar as human rights are concerned, the results are much the same--rights are restricted in order to maximize the government's management capacity.

Terrorism. Terrorist violence stemming primarily, although not exclusively, from the radical left has presented a serious internal security threat to several Latin American

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governments in recent years. At the moment, only the Argentine authorities face an immediate threat from relatively large, well-armed and well-financed revolutionary groups. However, since the late 1960's, similar groups have been defeated in Bolivia, Uruguay and Chile, and smaller guerrilla groups have been controlled or are still operating in Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Mexico.

Terrorism is rooted in the political, social and economic conditions in which most Latin Americans live, and while the use of violence as a means for altering the status quo is not a new phenomenon in Latin America, the frequency and magnitude of the challenges in the 1970's has been unprecedented. Similar socio-economic and political settings have tended to produce political violence in different countries, but there is no clear cut answer to the question of whether terrorism has been a response to or provocation for government repression.

Although terrorism has sprung from indigenous roots, there is ample evidence that foreign governments have aided Latin American guerrillas. Cuba has been, by far, the chief source of support, with Havana having supplied training, weapons, propaganda and financing for a number of radical organizations. Currently, the Argentine Montoneros and ERP (People's Revolutionary Army), and perhaps the Chilean MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), are believed to be receiving financial support and advice through the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires.

Four Southern Cone terrorist organizations--the Argentine ERP, the Chilean MIR, the Bolivian ELN (National Liberation Army), and the Uruguayan Tupamaros--are linked internationally through the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). Founded in late 1973 primarily as the brainchild of the ERP, the JCR is now headquartered in Paris and has branches in many West European cities. It provides support for refugee Southern Cone terrorists, maintains contact with radical groups and individuals from Latin America and elsewhere, publishes propaganda attacking Southern Cone governments, and lobbies for the terrorists' cause with West European governments and international agencies, particularly in Geneva. There is evidence that the JCR has operated and may still be operating clandestine munitions plants (submachine guns, grenades, rockets) in Argentina, but the organization is not known to have sponsored any specific terrorist attacks.

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ERP money probably financed the creation of the JCR and its early operations, and Cuba has contributed funds and continues to do so. Recent information indicates that the Argentine Montoneros are paying at least part of the bill, despite the fact that they are not formally associated with the JCR. This probably reflects the severe setbacks that the ERP has suffered at the hands of the Argentine security forces.

In 1975, a second trans-national grouping of Latin American terrorists appeared, calling itself the Armed Liberation Front of Latin American Peoples (FALPL). Created to coordinate revolutionary elements dissatisfied with or not affiliated with the JCR, the FALPL is reportedly centered in Sweden and seeking funding from both Cuba and the People's Republic of China.

Right-wing terrorism has likewise contributed to Latin America's political violence, particularly in Brazil and Argentina. During 1975-76, and prior to the March 1976 military coup, the Argentine Anti-communist Alliance (AAA) was the most notorious of right-wing terrorist organizations. While it may never have existed as a coherent entity, operatives using the AAA insignia carried on a clandestine war with the left, kidnapping and murdering with seeming impunity. Police, military and labor union elements were all probably involved as AAA activists.

Since the March coup, right-wing killings have continued with the perpetrators going unpunished for the most part. The AAA no longer claims credit for assassinations, but security personnel do participate in covert, illegal actions against suspected subversives. GOA officials claim that some of the guilty are being punished, but this cannot be confirmed.

Scattered incidents attributable to right-wing operatives have occurred in Brazil since this past August, and like-minded elements in Colombia have issued threats against radicals. However, in neither country is the problem of right-wing violence nearly so critical as it is in Argentina.

Human Rights. While civil and political rights always fall victim to authoritarian practices, it does not necessarily follow that illegal arrest and imprisonment, torture, and murder will become standard security measures as they have in several Latin nations. Severe repression and a "consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights"

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appear to result when a military government perceives the threat of violent opposition. Thus in Brazil where the military government perceives no immediate threat, illegal detentions, torture, and murder have declined in recent years. In Argentina, however, where the armed forces are currently battling terrorists, the trend has been in the opposite direction.

Latin-US Interaction

Into this Latin American view of the problem is injected heightened concern in the US over human rights.

The failure of specific Latin governments to meet minimum standards in protecting the human rights of their citizens has led the US Congress and a number of domestic and international organizations to focus attention on human rights practices with new urgency. This renewed attention is reflected, for example, in several Congressional acts that proscribe US aid for chronic human rights violators.

- The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 that provides authorization for AID programs in FY 76 and 77, stipulated that assistance be denied to countries that engage in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."
- The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1976 prohibits provision of security assistance to human rights violators and places strict limits on military and economic aid to Chile.
- The Harkin Amendment to the replenishment bill (Public Law 94-302) for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) compels the US to vote against IDB loan requests from countries that engage in a "consistent pattern...", unless the loan project directly benefits the needy.
- The FY 77 Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill includes the Koch Amendment that forces termination of certain kinds of military aid to Uruguay on human rights grounds.

Problem countries. Few Latin nations can boast a pristine record on human rights, but four Southern Cone countries have presented the most serious problems in recent years.

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--Argentina was the scene of extensive human rights violations prior to the military's ouster of the Peron government on March 24, 1976, but only after the coup did international attention focus on events there. Since the March coup, political violence has claimed at least 1500 lives.

The military junta under President Videla is engaged in a bloody battle with left-wing guerrillas. The Marxist-Peronist Montoneros and the erstwhile Trotskyite ERP are the most formidable organizations, but there are several lesser groups. Cuba has supplied training and aid to ERP and the Montoneros, but such support has not been critical to the existence or operational capacity of either group.

While subjected to heavy military pressure in recent months, the terrorists have concentrated on killing security personnel and executives of large, foreign-owned corporations and infiltrating the nation's powerful labor movement. The subversives' objective is to provoke military repression so brutal that Argentines will turn against the government and opt for national leadership that shares the ideological sympathies of the radical left.

Hundreds of terrorists have been killed and thousands arrested, and the treatment of suspected subversives has involved serious human rights violations, including torture and murder. The ERP has taken the brunt of the onslaught thus far; many of its national leaders have been killed, and its capacity for generating disruptive violence has been significantly reduced. The Montoneros have also suffered heavy losses, but it is a larger organization and remains a dangerous military force. Government claims of victory over the terrorists are premature. The security forces are winning the battle, but it will be several months before political violence can be reduced to levels the government considers tolerable.

Political violence and human rights violations have also resulted from right-wing vigilante activities attributable primarily to off-duty police and military personnel. Posing as official security agents, they have kidnapped, tortured and/or murdered hundreds of Argentines and foreign residents suspected of leftist sympathies. Their actions are known to high-level security and administration officials, and GOA authorities have stated

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privately that some of the guilty are being punished. Nonetheless, the depredations continue.

Military authorities have detained an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 persons under state of siege powers invoked on November 6, 1974. Neither a list of those jailed nor the charges against them have been made public, although hundreds are known to have been released after investigation. Many of these detainees are former Peronist officials, and so far as is known, prisoners of this type are not suffering the same kind of treatment handed out to suspected subversives.

Civil and political rights have been curtailed, with all political activity suspended, most labor union activity and all strikes prohibited, and the press operating under self-censorship.

--Brazil's human rights problems stem from the application of drastic national security measures adopted in 1967 (National Security Law of 1967) and 1968 (Institutional Act. No. 5) to control opposition to the post-1964 military-based regime. Both measures were imposed primarily to suppress political dissidence, rather than to control terrorism which did not reach alarming proportions until later. Subversive violence mounted in 1968-69 and peaked in 1970-71, but Brazil never faced a terrorist problem remotely on the scale of Argentina's. Security forces virtually eradicated leftist terrorism by 1972, and it has not posed a significant problem since.

While the National Security Law and Institutional Act No. 5 themselves may be considered infringements of human rights, foreign and domestic critics have concentrated on the abuse of prisoners arrested under powers specified in those measures. Many prisoners have been subjected to physical and psychological torture, and some have been killed either purposely or accidentally by interrogators. Others have simply disappeared with the government unwilling or unable to provide an explanation.

There is almost universal agreement that political prisoners are not now being tortured, except possibly in isolated cases. Relaxation of press censorship has increased public awareness of arrests and resulted in demands for investigation of past abuses. It is questionable, however, whether this trend will survive opposition from conservative political forces.

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Recent bombings in Rio and Sao Paulo claimed by a previously unknown group called the Brazilian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAB) have raised fears that disgruntled right wingers may be adopting the tactics of like-minded elements in Argentina. The AAB almost certainly is not sanctioned by the Geisel administration, although it may enjoy some support from elements in the security forces. In any event, the AAB is still a minor problem.

--Chile's human rights record has been, if not the worst, at least the most publicized over the last three years. After three years, the military government that overthrew Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973 remains an authoritarian regime obsessed with security considerations.

An effective internal security apparatus operates with little apparent restraint from President Pinochet or anyone else. The main terrorist threat, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), has been all but annihilated. Thus, in May of this year, the security forces began to concentrate on the Communist Party of Chile, which, despite its once legal, orderly and gradualist posture, is subversive in the eyes of the junta. Decrees providing safeguards for persons detained under state of siege conditions are ignored by security personnel who regularly act illegally and brutally.

With respect to political rather than subversive opponents of the junta, some changes have occurred. The number of detainees decreased in 1976, and torture of acknowledged detainees virtually ceased. In November, the junta dramatically announced the release of over 300 persons being held without charges under state of siege provisions. Embassy Santiago calculates, and well-informed Church sources confirm, that the number of persons held for political/security reasons, in the broadest sense of the term, has decreased from about 4,000 in March 1976 to about 900 in early December. On the other hand, the number of "disappearances"--a euphemism for unacknowledged detentions--increased sharply during the middle of the year.

In September 1976, the junta issued three constitutional acts (decrees) that apparently constitute the first steps towards what President Pinochet terms a "new democracy". They are not expected to alter the government's authoritarian character or its human rights practices in the near future.

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--Uruguay's difficulties originated in the 1969-70 emergence of the Tupamaros, a powerful Marxist guerrilla organization that obtained training and funds from Havana. National security forces contained the Tupamaros by late 1973, but in the process traditional civil and political liberties were curbed, and severe human rights abuses occurred.

Uruguay's Congress was a casualty of the anti-terrorist struggle. In June 1973, Juan Maria Bordaberry, the constitutionally elected president, acted with armed forces support to close Congress and invest its legislative powers in a Council of State. Uruguay has since been ruled under a civilian-military formula in which the preponderance of power rests with the military. President Bordaberry was quietly ousted in June 1976, and on September 1, Aparicio Mendez began a five-year term described by military leaders as the initial step in a transition to traditional democratic procedures.

During the anti-Tupamaros struggle, Congress, and subsequently the Council of State, enacted measures curbing civil rights and granting the security forces extraordinary powers in cases pertaining to national security. Nonetheless, in both their efforts against the Tupamaros and later against an armed Communist Party group, security personnel were guilty of human rights violations; illegal arrest and imprisonment, torture, and, in a few cases, probably murder. Few such violations are believed to have occurred since early 1976, but national security remains a priority concern of Uruguayan authorities.

Normal political activity is banned, and the political rights of a wide spectrum of former politicians were recently withdrawn in what was termed a necessary step toward political normalization. All leftist influence is prohibited in labor and educational circles, and freedom of expression is generally restricted.

Other Latin American governments such as those of Cuba, Paraguay and Nicaragua might be added to the list of chronic human rights violators. However, the four discussed here have presented the most difficulty from the US diplomatic standpoint in recent years, and the balance of this paper will focus on them.

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The Latin American Perspective

An appreciation of the perspective of the four Southern Cone governments is important for understanding their reactions to human rights criticism from abroad.

Primary emphasis must be placed on the official perception of internal security as the number one national priority. The battle against leftist subversion is viewed not simply as a police action to maintain public order, but literally as a war to preserve a particular way of life. Terrorists become less citizens with basic rights protected under the nation's laws than foreign enemies in what is sometimes referred to as a world war against Marxist/Communist aggression. The terrorists' status as citizens by birth is considered incidental to the fact that they fight in support of a foreign ideology and, allegedly at least, receive foreign training, weapons, funds and moral support. Counterterrorist tactics tend to be determined not by what are viewed as legal and constitutional niceties, but by the demands of the battle. Torture and similar methods are rationalized as temporary expedients essential for obtaining timely and effective intelligence against subversives.

Among Southern Cone governments, there is a clear tendency to reject the notion that concern for the protection of human rights is an issue which transcends national borders and therefore constitutes legitimate grounds for intervention in the affairs of another state. This position frequently appears in the contention that maintenance of internal security is a question that impinges on national sovereignty and is, therefore, an area in which foreign intervention cannot be permitted. On October 1, Uruguay's Foreign Minister, Juan Carlos Blanco, was explicit in his statement before the UN General Assembly,

"Uruguay will systematically impugn decisions (i.e., Koch Amendment),..., which go beyond the internal authority of a national organ (read US Congress) to dispose by its free will of funds, which signify by their international projection an offense against dignity and unacceptable interference which my government rejects with severity and energy."

Another facet of the response to foreign criticism stems from the belief that terrorism represents only one segment of a worldwide communist onslaught. Charges leveled by organizations like Amnesty International and UN agencies are consistently portrayed as part of an international conspiracy

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conceived and financed by the Soviet bloc to discredit strongly anti-communist governments. Visits by internationally-based investigative missions are rejected on the grounds that their participants are, wittingly or not, part of the alleged conspiracy. Critical reports from human rights groups are rejected on the same grounds, and protests are registered concerning the failure of such groups to devote equal time and attention to abuses committed by leftist governments.

Chilean and Uruguayan authorities have been the most outspoken critics of allegedly biased and discriminatory concern over human rights. They are probably convinced of the validity of their charges, and while conspiracy may be too strong a word, the Soviets and Cubans among others have undoubtedly supported international smear campaigns aimed at Chile and Uruguay. In any event, it should also be noted that the alleged conspiracy provides a convenient device for deflecting criticism. By portraying the issue in essentially political terms and thereby damning the critics as contaminated at the source, grounds are established for ignoring the substance of the human rights charges themselves.

Perception of the US Position

Expressions of official US displeasure, whether in the form of punitive Congressional action or quiet diplomatic approaches, are particularly unwelcome to Southern Cone governments. Because military leaders in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay consider themselves good friends of the US, official US criticism sparks a sense of abandonment. They feel that their war against leftist subversion merits US support and encouragement, not condemnation. When, in their eyes, the US fails to remain neutral and instead imposes restrictions on military and/or economic aid, the Southern Cone attitude toward the US tends to become somewhat ambivalent.

In the most conservative and adamantly anti-communist military circles, the "soft" US line on human rights is sometimes perceived as a consequence of detente. Essentially, the US is viewed as willing to sacrifice its real (i.e., strongly anti-communist) friends in order to improve US-USSR relations.

The dual perception of an international communist conspiracy and abandonment by the US heightens the sense of isolation among government leaders. In the presence of a

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perceived security threat, the result is often an even more rigid commitment to established lines of behavior rather than a relaxation of illegal security practices.

Finally, the perception of some Southern Cone leaders is probably influenced by what they consider proof that, in strictly pragmatic terms, harsh, repressive measures produce results. As to internal security, they would argue that the methods employed by security forces in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, however morally repugnant, have crushed subversion by the far left. Furthermore, they would say, the economic record of Brazil, at least until recently, and the gradual economic recovery taking place in Uruguay can be interpreted as evidence that efficient, rational management under the authoritarian eye of military officials makes good economic sense.

Regional Cooperation Stimulated

Among the more noteworthy reactions of Southern Cone nations to international human rights criticism has been the intensification of diplomatic, economic and intelligence cooperation among the four countries cited above, along with Bolivia and Paraguay. Each of the six has specific reasons for promoting regional cooperation, and there are many bilateral and multilateral projects within the region that have nothing to do with the recent trend toward cooperation. Nonetheless, the fact that all except Bolivia have been subjected to intense criticism on human rights grounds has nurtured a common awareness of shared perceptions and problems and encouraged cooperation as a means of confronting a generally hostile international community. As might be expected, Chile, the most internationally isolated of the six, has been the chief promoter of regional cooperation, but the remaining five have responded positively and sometimes enthusiastically.

In the diplomatic arena, five of the six countries, with Brazil being the exception, are reportedly coordinating their foreign policies vis-a-vis the US and issues associated with international terrorism and Marxism/Communism. According to an Uruguayan general, the Harkin Amendment was the impetus for cooperative action on relations with the US because it evoked fears that US economic aid to one or more of the countries would be terminated. Current plans call for each country to maintain the facade of independent diplomatic activity while pursuing common policy lines agreed upon in secret negotiations.

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The intensification of attempts at economic cooperation in the Southern Cone is evident in the numerous exchanges of visits by official economic missions in recent months. Whether the pace of official contact will be mirrored in substantive economic programs and/or significant increases in intraregional trade remains to be seen.

Chile's Minister of Economy has reportedly broached with the Argentines the possibility of a customs union encompassing Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. In addition, Chile's recent willingness to consider abandoning the Andean Pact (Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela) has been fostered not only by domestic economic considerations, but also by the belief that the Southern Cone offers superior market possibilities for Chilean goods.

Cooperation in the fight against subversion is the centerpiece of multilateral contacts in the Southern Cone. Intensification of the normal contacts that occur among security forces has been spurred by the ideological compatibility of the area's governments, by their mutual perceptions as outlined above, and by the international mobility and contacts of subversive groups that have been institutionalized in the JCR and FALPL.

To counter this common threat, Southern Cone security forces have conceived "Operation Condor" which envisions extending counterterrorist cooperation far beyond the limits of traditional intelligence exchanges. One facet of Condor calls for better organized, computer-based information files. Another more ominous facet involves the murder of individuals that any of the cooperating governments consider security risks. Plans call for assassination squads to function in both the Southern Cone and Western Europe, but Bolivia and Brazil have refused to participate in any European operations. At last report, Argentine and Uruguayan agents had tried and failed to assassinate three individuals in Paris, and Uruguayan authorities were reportedly reconsidering the wisdom of such activities.

Problem for the US. Diplomatic and economic cooperation among Southern Cone nations presents no particular problems for US interests. The governments involved are not ideologically opposed to the US, and no deep and abiding anti-US bias inspired the current trend towards regional unity. Resentment over the US stance on human rights exists, and Southern Cone leaders undoubtedly feel their case will be

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strengthened through mutual reenforcement in a common front. However, there is no evidence that they are contemplating an economic or diplomatic assault on US interests. The fact that the US remains a primary source of trade and financial opportunities for the region militates strongly against such actions.

In the case of Condor, the potential for problems is greater. If Condor operatives begin assassinating opponents in Latin America and/or Western Europe, human rights will almost certainly become an even more critical issue in our bilateral relations with the nations involved. The likelihood of additional aid cutoffs would increase, and a general souring of our relations within the region would probably result.

Reactions to International Approaches

Human rights violations by Latin American governments have provoked both bilateral and multilateral approaches by foreign governments and international organizations interested in halting the abuses. While it is impossible to say what the human rights situation might have become in the absence of such diplomatic efforts, it can be said generally that Latin governments have:

- resented approaches from whatever source and tended to view them as intervention in their internal affairs;
- not responded to outside pressure as long as they perceived an immediate internal security threat; and
- learned, nonetheless, that they cannot continually affront the human rights sensitivities of the rest of the world without paying a price in terms of diplomatic and political isolation and economic disadvantages.

Bilateral approaches. US bilateral efforts to persuade specific Latin American governments to respect fundamental human rights have not been notably successful. Representations on behalf of US citizens, and in some cases foreign nationals, have produced results, but in no instance has the combination of verbal encouragement and the potential or actual termination of US aid and support demonstrably altered

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the human rights practices of an offending government. In the case of Chile's recent release of detainees, international pressure, including bilateral efforts by the US, undoubtedly influenced the junta's decision. However, the critical factors were probably the absence of an internal security threat and the discussions of Chile's case then taking place at the United Nations.

Much of the reason for the apparent futility of US efforts lies in the perception of Latin governments described above. So long as the question of human rights is linked to the maintenance of internal security, outside criticism is not likely to influence governmental policies. Not infrequently, US diplomats encounter government officials who are unable or unwilling to make the connection between their human rights abuses and US aid cutoffs.

Multilateral approaches. Shifting at least part of the burden for action on human rights matters from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy may produce beneficial results. Within the Latin American context, this means expanding and emphasizing the role of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), an initiative already undertaken by US representatives in the Organization of American States (OAS).

- US proposals for OAS reform have consistently highlighted protection of human rights as one of three areas of primary activity for a revitalized hemispheric organization.
- The US delegation to the OAS General Assembly in Santiago strongly supported efforts to strengthen the IAHRC.
- The Congressional bill appropriating US funding for the OAS earmarked \$102,000 of the US voluntary contribution for the IAHRC.

Emphasis upon multilateral as a complement to bilateral diplomacy would extract the US from the position of appearing to impose unilaterally its human rights criteria on Latin America. It is difficult to argue that attempts to strengthen the IAHRC will result in significant changes in the practices of some Latin governments. Certainly the IAHRC's experience with Chile argues against exaggerated expectations. At the

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same time, however, it would tend to eliminate the "we-they" aspect of the issue and place responsibility for safeguarding human rights equally in the hands of all countries in the hemisphere. All nations would be placed in a position of responding to criticism from an agency that they themselves created and help maintain.

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