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1. COMMENT:
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REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE CONDOR ORGANIZATION
MET IN BUENOS AIRES 13-16 DECEMBER 1976 TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES
AND DISCUSS FUTURE PLANS. THE PRINCIPAL ITEM ON THE AGENDA WAS THE
DISCUSSION AND PLANNING OF COORDINATED PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERA-
TIONS DIRECTED AGAINST LEFTIST AND RADICAL GROUPS IN THE VARIOUS
MEMBER COUNTRIES. OPERATION CONDOR IS A COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENT AMONG
SECURITY SERVICES OF CHILE, ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, PARAGUAY, URUGUAY, AND
BRAZIL TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION.)
NOT AWARE OF ANY OPERATIONS BEING
RUN IN EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR EUROPE BY CONDOR COUNTRIES.
SECURITY HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED AT THE
OPERATIONS CENTER IN BUENOS AIRES AND COMPARTMENTATION INCREASED AFTER
CONDOR REPRESENTATIVES FOUND OUT IN SEPTEMBER 1976 THAT THE FRENCH

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INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WAS AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE AND SOME OBJECTIVES OF
OPERATION CONDOR; THUS, NOT SURE ABOUT OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE,
ALTHOUGH HE EMPHASIZED THAT DISCUSSION OF OPERATIONS IN EITHER THE E0252
U.S. OR EUROPE WAS NOT SURFACED AT THE MEETING HELD 13-16 DECEMBER.
REACTION TO THIS PARTICULAR BREACH OF SECURITY WAS
EXTREMELY HARSH IN ARGENTINA WHICH RESULTED IN THE FIRING OF THE THEN
DIRECTOR OF THE ARGENTINE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INTELLIGENCE (SIDE) AND
REPLACING WITH GENERAL CARLOS ENRIQUE A D L A W, THE CURRENT
DIRECTOR. THE FOREGOING INCIDENT MADE CONDOR REPRESEN-
TATIVES REALIZE THAT THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ARE PROBABLY AWARE
OF THEIR ORGANIZATION AND, THEREFORE, EVERYTHING IS HANDLED ACCORDINGLY,
I.E., WITH A MAXIMUM OF CAUTION. COMMENT: GENERAL OTTO
PALADINO WAS THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF SIDE. NO PREVIOUS
REPORTING INDICATES THAT HIS REPLACEMENT WAS A DISCIPLINARY MEASURE.)
3. CONCERNING CURRENT CONDOR OPERATIONS,
THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON SUBVERSIVES AND TERRORISTS WAS
BEING CONDUCTED MOSTLY BILATERALLY BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF
MEMBER COUNTRIES. IN THE COVERT ACTION FIELD, BOTH
ARGENTINA AND CHILE WERE MAKING EXTENSIVE USE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
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MEDIA FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. THE THRUST OF THESE	
PROPAGANDA EFFORTS WAS TWOFOLD: TO REFUTE CRITICISM LEVELLED AT THE	02
RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS BY THE FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA AND INTERNA-	
TIONAL FORA AND TO INSTILL A NEW SENSE OF NATIONAL PRIDE IN THE	
POPULATION. CHILE HAD RECENTLY COMPLETED TWO FILMS	
ON "CHILE AFTER ALLENDE" WHICH IT WAS ASKING CONDOR REPRESENTATIVES	
TO SHOW ON TELEVISION IN THEIR COUNTRIES. TO DATE, ONLY URUGUAY AND	
ARGENTINA HAVE AGREED TO SHOW THEM. PARAGUAY HAD	
ONLY MADE USE OF THE PRESS, THE DAILY NEWSPAPER "PATRIA" IN WHICH	
PROPAGANDA WAS PERIODICALLY INSERTED. A REQUEST TO USE	
TELEVISION FOR THIS PURPOSE WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY HIS SUPERIORS	
AS WAS A REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL NEWS AGENCY.	
THE LATTER WOULD PROBABLY NEVER COME TO PASS BECAUSE	
FUNDS SIMPLY WERE NOT AVAILABLE FOR SUCH AN UNDERTAKING.	
4. LASTLY, THE MEETING THAT WAS TO BE HELD	
IN ASUNCION IN MARCH 1977 ON "PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TECHNIQUES AGAINST	
TERRORISTS AND LEFTIST EXTREMISTS" WAS CANCELLED BECAUSE OF THE	
INABILITY OF ARGENTINA AND PARAGUAY TO PARTICIPATE.	-
BOTH COUNTRIES' INTELLIGENCE SERVICES HAD BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN	į
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SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE LATIN-AMERICAN
ANTI-COMMUNIST CONFEDERATION HELD 28-30 MARCH, AS WELL AS IN THE PREPARATION FOR THE 20 APRIL STATE VISIT OF ARGENTINE PRESIDENT JORGE V I D E L A TO PARAGUAY. A NEW DATE FOR
THE NEXT CONDOR MEETING HAD NOT BEEN SET.
DEPORT GLASS S. D. C. D. C. WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SCHROES
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SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED --

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LATIN AMERICA

1. IN LATE MARCH 1977

THE CONDOR ORGANIZATION IS

SUFFERING FROM A LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG MEMBERS WHICH HAS RE-

SULTED IN A LACK OF RESULTS AND ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF CONDOR.

THE FOLLOWING POINTS JUSTIFYING HIS CRITICISM:

A. CONDOR HAS HELD SEVERAL MEETINGS BUT HAS ACCOMPLISHED NOTHING, AS MEMBERS HAVE GENERALLY NOT FOLLOWED THROUGH ON THE PROPOSALS AGREED TO DURING THE MEETINGS. THE MEETINGS SERVE

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MERELY AS SOCIAL OCCASIONS;

- B. MEETINGS OF CONDOR ARE CONSTANTLY BEING SCHEDULED AND SUB-
- C. BASED ON A PROPOSAL AGREED TO BY ALL MEMBERS DURING A CONDOR MEETING, THE GOVERNMENT OF ASKED ALL MEMBERS TO PROVIDE TRACES ON CERTAIN LEFTISTS. HOWEVER, NOT ONE CONDOR MEMBER RESPONDED TO THE REQUEST. THE ALSO REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM ALL MEMBERS CONCERNING THE FIFTH CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS AND ARGENTINA WAS THE ONLY MEMBER TO RESPOND;

D. THE PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY OF CONDOR APPEARS TO BE ONLY THE BI-LATERAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN AND ARGENTINA;

E. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT OF CONDOR IS THE MOST ACTIVE WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION, HOWEVER, THAT ACTIVITY IS

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LIMITED TO AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND AN OPERATION HAS NEVER

BEEN CARRIED TO COMPLETION.

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