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
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THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

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Operation Condor as an International System of State Violence and Terror: A Historical-Structural Analysis

J. Patrice McSherry

In the 1970s, Operation Condor—a covert, multinational “black operations” program organized by six Latin American states and secretly assisted by the US government—produced new patterns of politicized violence in the hemisphere. Condor operatives carried out the covert, cross-border abduction-disappearance of exiled dissidents, “rendition” to other countries, torture, and extrajudicial execution. Condor squads also assassinated, or attempted to assassinate, key political opposition leaders exiled in Latin America, Europe, and the United States. This chapter assesses the origins of Condor collaboration and methods of state terror in the context of a system of hegemony shaped by Washington in the post-Second World War era. Theoretically, the chapter explores the interaction of structural factors and human agency in the formation, functioning, and final waning of the repressive system known as Operation Condor, adapting concepts from Robert Cox and from Cardoso and Faletto as a framework.

After the Second World War, and especially after the 1959 Cuban Revolution, new progressive and nationalist movements in Latin America issued passionate calls for social justice, control of national resources, nationalization of foreign-owned businesses, greater political participation,

land reform, an end to repression, free education, and equality for the oppressed. The 1960s in particular was a tumultuous time in which popular movements demanded new rights and a restructuring of political and economic power. Many workers, peasants, clergy, students, and teachers joined organizations demanding social change. Several guerrilla movements also emerged. As leftist and nationalist leaders won elections throughout Latin America in the 1960s and early 1970s, and new revolutionary and progressive movements gained strength, US security strategists feared a communist-inspired threat to US economic and political interests in the hemisphere. Local elites similarly feared that their traditional political dominance and wealth were at risk.

US officials reorganized the inter-American security system to combat the forces of revolution and social change, expanding the US military presence in the region, incorporating Latin American partners within a dense matrix of hemispheric security institutions, and launching counterinsurgency efforts. The Cold War counterinsurgency regime unified the continent's military, police, and intelligence forces under US leadership in a mission of "internal defense and development"²¹ undergirded by fierce anticommunism. While a number of Latin American militaries had previously been political actors, going so far as to take power and preside over military regimes, the new continental security system modernized military capabilities and legitimized a central political role for the armed forces—and justified the harsh repression and the use of extralegal methods against so-called internal enemies. US policymakers often prized their foreign counterparts more for their commitment to anticommunism than to human rights or democratic principles. While some military sectors resisted US influence, over time armed institutions throughout the region adopted the counterinsurgency mission. In the 1960s, '70s, and early '80s US-backed armed forces carried out coups throughout Latin America, moving to obliterate leftist forces and extirpate their ideas. While the forms of repression used in each country differed, the counterinsurgents shared key goals: namely, to eliminate actual and potential "internal enemies," and to reorganize their states and societies to consolidate military power.

The Condor prototype was formed within the inter-American system by early 1974, coalescing after the Uruguayan coup (June 1973) and the Chilean coup (September 1973). Tens of thousands of people from these

countries and others fled to Argentina—the last outpost of democracy (under Juan Perón)—to escape severe repression. The military governments in Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay, as well as the CIA, were acutely concerned about these exiles, fearing their activities against these regimes and the probability of international sympathy for pro-democracy movements. Condor was their weapon against them. One former CIA officer, Philip Agee, noted that in the 1960s the CIA had routinely spied on refugees and exiles from the Southern Cone countries and gave lists of suspects to the security forces to round up. “We had many Paraguayans under surveillance in Montevideo,” he said. “Montevideo was the place for Brazilians, Argentines, and Paraguayans in the 60s and we had them all under surveillance.”² Such spying was later subsumed under Operation Condor. Agee said he was sure that the CIA acted within Condor.

Condor, “officially” institutionalized in November 1975, filled a crucial function in the inter-American counterinsurgency regime. While the militaries carried out massive repression within their own countries, the transnational Condor system silenced individuals and groups that had escaped these dictatorships to prevent them from organizing politically or influencing public opinion. The anticommunist mission of which Condor was a part ultimately crushed democratic as well as radical movements and individuals. Latin American elites and military commanders, for the most part, enthusiastically adopted the internal security doctrines, countersubversive mission, and unconventional warfare methods promoted by the United States.³ Thus, to understand the counterinsurgency regime, as well as the violence and terror sown by Condor in this era, both system- and state-level analysis must be considered. Condor was not solely a Latin American (or Chilean) initiative; nor was it simply an instrument of Washington.

I posit that four key factors led to a continent-wide wave of state terror during the Cold War, including Operation Condor. First, a shared Cold War ideological framework and counterinsurgency orientation, energetically fostered in inter-American facilities and by US Mobile Training Teams. Second, an acceptance of harsh, illegal methods as a legitimate part of an all-out struggle to eliminate perceived existential enemies. Third, the willingness among Condor commanders across the region to allow foreign military and intelligence operations on their soil in the

pursuit of enemies across borders, even if suspending sovereignty rights (and violating asylum and human rights norms). Finally, the impetus and resources from a powerful state to train, assist, finance, and arm security institutions and facilitate the development of a covert transnational organization. This analysis suggests that Condor was a product of a contingent set of factors—although it was created largely to preserve the existing structures of wealth and power in the region.

This chapter argues that structural and contingent factors should not be considered an either-or question. Long-term structures form the context and the parameters within which human agency operates. Structural conditions influence, constrain, and shape, but do not determine, decisions made by states and individuals. Decision-makers are presented with both opportunities and limits posed by structural conditions, but their decisions are not preordained. Historical developments are the product of the complex, reciprocal interaction between structures—long-term power relations in political, military, and economic spheres—and contingent choices, which can also shape structures. Structures are not permanent; they can shift, especially during wars or economic crises, or when a critical mass of political opposition generates significant challenges to the existing system of power relations, creating what Robert Cox calls “counterhegemony.”

Theoretical Context: Structure and Agency

I define structural conditions as long-term economic, military, and political systems of power relations and dominant ideologies, including long-standing socioeconomic conditions such as poverty, inequality, and exploitation. My analysis draws from Cox⁴ as well as Cardoso and Faletto.⁵ Cox’s model, which builds on Gramsci, illuminates the ways in which power, ideology, and economic (production) relations combine to produce world-historical structures or blocs. By highlighting the interaction between global and state-level factors, Cox bridges the span between comparative and international politics. Cardoso and Faletto also offer a nondeterminist, nuanced analytical framework through which to understand power relations and the dynamics of structure and agency. They argue that “although enduring, social structures can be, and in fact are, continuously

transformed by social movements,” and assert that their historical-structural approach “emphasizes not just the structural conditioning of social life, but also the historical transformation of structures by conflict, social movements, and class struggles.”⁶ They add:

The emphasis on the structural aspect can convey the impression that situations of dependency are stable and permanent. . . . Our approach should bring to the forefront both aspects of social structures: the mechanisms of self-perpetuation and the possibilities for change. Social structures impose limits on social processes and reiterate established forms of behavior. However, they also generate contradictions and social tensions, opening the possibilities for social movements and ideologies of change. . . . Subordinated social groups and classes, as well as dominated countries, try to counterattack dominant interests that sustain structures of domination.⁷

Cardoso and Faletto recognize that structures are not permanent or inevitable, but are shaped and reshaped through a process of social change and struggle by social and political actors moving to assert their interests and escape domination and dependency.

Cox’s complex model also avoids the pitfalls of determinism that plague some structural theories, such as Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism.⁸ Waltz argues that the distribution of capabilities in a system essentially determines state behavior; international structures compel states to act in predictable ways no matter which individuals or parties are in power. In contrast, Cox stresses the potential of social forces to influence and transform structural constraints and historic blocs. Structures condition; they affect calculations of interest by elites and non-elites; they can be changed through human agency. Cox defines a “counterhegemonic force” as the combination of an “increase in material resources available to subordinate groups and a coherent and persistent articulation of the subordinate group’s demands that challenges the legitimacy of the prevailing consensus.”⁹

Cox emphasizes the institutions of power that enforce and advance economic models, positing linkages among ideas and ideology, material capabilities (power), and institutions on a world scale, which may result in either hegemonic or coercive regimes. During the Cold War US interests and actions powerfully shaped international and hemispheric structures. Washington's strategy combined both hegemonic and coercive elements. In Latin America and elsewhere, Washington's foreign policy promoted US-style market capitalism, adherence to the political orientation of the United States, and adoption of an anticommunist security doctrine that particularly targeted "the enemy within." Those political, military, and economic agendas became an integral part of hemispheric relations and national politics and economics in Latin America. While some Latin American governments diverged from Washington in important interest areas, such as economic policy, US leaders had substantial success in their efforts to integrate the region's military and security forces into a more cohesive whole within the counterinsurgency regime. That development was unusual in historical terms. Given the asymmetrical power resources that characterized hemispheric relations, Washington was often able to shape outcomes in ways beneficial to US interests. Moreover, many Latin American elites shared Washington's anticommunism and its fear of social mobilization, especially after the Cuban Revolution. Such leaders were often more responsive to Washington than to their own citizens. When reformist or radical challenges to the dominant order arose, Washington and its Latin American allies often employed coercion—legal and extralegal—to quell them.

Thus, in Latin America during the Cold War a historical structure, in Cox's terms, emerged, dominated by anticommunist ideological concepts and a set of continental institutions backed by US power capabilities. Those structural conditions help to explain why the Condor states, some of which had formerly been adversaries, united for the first time to jointly pursue "subversives" outside the rule of law and beyond their own borders. Previously these militaries had jealously guarded their sovereignty and harbored suspicions of their neighbors. But during the Cold War, military commanders came to share an overarching security doctrine that stressed "ideological frontiers" rather than national borders. They agreed to meld together secret intelligence and "hunter-killer" units to operate in

one another's territories, an unprecedented development. Condor was also unprecedented because it wholly left aside any pretense of lawful methods and instead used terror to intimidate and eliminate perceived enemies extraterritorially.

In short, Condor was organized as a covert counterterror apparatus at a particular historical moment, when there was a broad convergence of interests between Washington and the right-wing military regimes of South America and a readiness to combat so-called subversion by whatever means necessary. Since the 1950s Washington had moved to foster and support such like-minded regimes, and weaken or oust leftist or progressive leaders, using its enormous resources in pursuit of a foreign policy designed to shore up US hegemony in the hemisphere in the context of the Cold War. Latin American elites pursued their own perceived interests but were also forcefully and incessantly pressured by Washington. Domestic social conflicts were transformed into continental security crises under the Cold War hegemonic framework.

Given these structural conditions, shaped by US power through both incentives and threats, many of the Latin American political leaders had a fairly narrow range of choices. Many were happy to take advantage of opportunities presented by Washington's agenda to seize more power, secure their economic positions, and consolidate their grip on society. Others who were less accommodating faced threats of termination of economic or military aid, blocking of credits through the IMF or World Bank, covert sabotage, or even overthrow. A number of Latin American leaders who defied or differed from the US agenda were subject to covert action to undermine and/or oust them (Árbenz in Guatemala, Goulart in Brazil, Allende in Chile, the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, and so on). US forces also worked to enhance the influence of those hardline military officers aligned with US goals, to promote the counterinsurgency sector of the region's armed forces over more constitutionalist sectors.

Yet Condor as an active hunter-killer organization declined and disappeared in the early 1980s in South America (although key Condor officers relocated to Central America, where they set up a Condor-like system as revolutionary movements gained strength there in the '80s¹⁰). The parastatal structures and forces that had played a powerful role for some eight or nine years faded from view. Several explanations can be proposed.

First, Washington's alliance with Britain (rather than Argentina) during the 1982 Falklands (or Malvinas) War angered many Latin American militaries. Second, mass social and political opposition movements in South America had been largely extinguished (although important new human rights organizations were emerging)—that is, Condor's objectives had been largely fulfilled. Third, outside forces such as the United Nations and international human rights organizations, as well as officials in the Carter administration, were aware of Condor and were beginning to investigate and push back.

The Condor case indicates that structures that are powerful at their peak can change, weaken, and finally pass into history. The repression itself engendered new forms of opposition. These observations support the proposition that Condor was a result of a contingent set of factors within the broader structural framework of the Cold War. The combination of a fierce and ruthless internal security doctrine with the capabilities provided by hemispheric military-security institutions and the US government conditioned the choices made by governments in the region in ways that suited both US and Latin American elite interests in preserving existing political and economic hierarchies.

After the end of the Cold War these structural conditions shifted again, opening possibilities for new forms of agency in Latin America. Latin Americans were able to seize new opportunities in part due to the failures of the US-promoted model. New norms and counterhegemonic movements arose based on the popular rejection of key components of the US-sponsored global order and the historical memory of the dirty wars. In the twenty-first century, Latin American states have taken increasingly independent positions. Given the new configuration of social forces and political actors in the region, it seems unlikely at the time of this writing that Condor could be reconstituted there in the foreseeable future. I return to this discussion presently.

The United States in the Cold War Inter-American Security System

As in Europe and Asia, Washington promoted a regional security strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Document NSC-141 (1952) outlined US policy for the Americas as follows:

We seek first and foremost an orderly political and economic development which will make the Latin-American nations resistant to the internal growth of communism and to Soviet political warfare. . . . Secondly, we seek hemisphere solidarity in support of our world policy and the cooperation of the Latin-American nations in safeguarding the hemisphere through individual and collective defense measures against external aggression and internal subversion.¹¹

Washington had begun urging military collaboration in the hemisphere after the Second World War through organizations such as the US Army Caribbean School—created in 1946 and later renamed the School of the Americas (SOA)—and agreements such as the Rio Pact of 1947, which proclaimed the concept of hemispheric defense. Other institutions that integrated the continent’s armies included the Inter-American Defense Board and the Conferences of American Armies. The Conferences were initiated by US commanders in 1960 to fuse together the region’s militaries against subversion and revolution during the Cold War. The 1959 Cuban Revolution had spurred an enhanced sense of threat among conservative sectors throughout the region, leading to deeper coordination and the noteworthy redefinition of the primary mission of the Latin American armed forces from *national defense* to *internal security*. Indeed, the curriculum of the SOA was completely transformed in 1961 to emphasize the threat posed by “internal enemies.” US and French personnel reorganized and trained the Latin American militaries to undertake aggressive counterinsurgency operations within their own societies. The US security establishment dramatically reoriented, reshaped, expanded, and mobilized the existing hemispheric system to turn these national militaries inward.

The United States had previously carried out covert paramilitary operations and regime changes in the region, such as the subversion and overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala in 1954, via proxy forces, while the French had begun teaching counterinsurgency doctrine in Argentina and Brazil in the 1950s. The CIA had been developing new methods of “psychological torture” since 1950 and refining tactics of unconventional warfare initiated in the Second World War.¹² US counterinsurgency training and doctrine incorporated these methods and fostered the use of terrorism, sabotage, and subversion as tools of paramilitary warfare,¹³ tactics that were enthusiastically adopted by many Latin American security forces. The 1960s saw the rapid development and implementation of a counterinsurgency paradigm in the region under both French and US influences. The CIA and the Special Forces became the key advocates, trainers, and advisers of unconventional warfare in Latin America. Much documentation exists on the instrumental role of US advisors in assisting Latin American militaries to create centralized intelligence and operations units, hunter-killer teams, and other secret forces to fight “subversives” during the Cold War.

Colombia provides an early case study. A US military advisory team visited in 1959 to provide advice on constructing a new internal security capability, developing “counter-guerrilla training, civil action programmes, intelligence structures, and communications networks,” and aiding the Colombians “to undertake offensive counter-insurgency and psychological warfare operations.”¹⁴ US advisors led the reorientation of the Colombian army from conventional to unconventional warfare and the reorganization of its forces to focus on internal security. They also helped to create and organize elite Ranger commandos based on the Special Forces model, a new national intelligence structure, and new PSY-WAR and civil action units. US Mobile Training Teams, composed of Special Operations Forces and intelligence advisors, assisted in the creation of “Intelligence/Hunter-Killer teams,” which included both military and civilian operatives, to pursue so-called subversives. The US team also recommended “paramilitary, sabotage, and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents.”¹⁵

A similar US mission was undertaken in Bolivia in 1962. The US government signed an agreement with Bolivia “to make available to the

Government of Bolivia defense articles and defense services for internal security,”¹⁶ and a US Army Military Group was dispatched to create and train a new unit. “Special action” training—or covert unconventional warfare and counterterror training, specifically to pursue and eliminate Che Guevara—was to be provided by the 8th Special Forces Group of Green Berets, as outlined in point 2 of the accord:

Recognizing a request from the Armed Forces of Bolivia for special training assistance during the initial organization and training phase of this unit, there will be provided a training team of U.S. Specialists from the 8th Special Forces, U.S. Army Forces, Panama, Canal Zone. . . . The mission of this team shall be to provide a rapid reaction force capable of counterinsurgency operations.¹⁷

The 8th Special Forces Group, based at Fort Gulick, Panama Canal Zone, was the US army’s only Special Action Force (specializing in counterinsurgency and counterterror operations, subversion and sabotage, unconventional warfare, and psychological warfare), and it was tasked with providing training to Latin American militaries.¹⁸ The Bolivian Ranger commando unit that captured and executed Che Guevara was set up and trained by the Mobile Training Team from the 8th Group. A CIA paramilitary officer, Cuban exile Félix Rodríguez, was also with the Bolivian unit at the time of Che’s capture and killing. Significantly, advisor Walt Rostow noted in a memo to President Johnson that Che’s killing “shows the soundness of our ‘preventive medicine’ assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency—it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered him and got him.”¹⁹ Such elite, covert commando organizations—some of which essentially became death squads—dramatically reshaped the state and its relation to society in Latin America and severely impacted human rights.

US military and CIA officers played crucial roles in creating other intelligence and operations organizations in the region, including the Serviço Nacional de Informações in Brazil, the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional in Chile, la Técnica in Paraguay, and the Dirección Nacional de Información e Inteligencia in Uruguay, among others. These intelligence

organizations became key proponents of human rights violations and terror in their countries, and they later formed the nucleus of Operation Condor.

US personnel, notably CIA officers, also played a key role in linking these units together. As one representative State Department policy document advised in 1971,

Public Safety and military assistance programs providing funds for the training of Uruguayan personnel in the U.S. and Panama . . . and the maintenance of in-country advisors will continue to provide the bulk of U.S. assistance. . . . It is especially desirable that such neighboring countries as Argentina and Brazil collaborate effectively with the Uruguayan security forces and where possible we should encourage such cooperation. . . . To improve the capability of services to successfully detain, interrogate and imprison suspected terrorists, we should consider advisability of providing expert advice, preferably through TDY [temporary duty, possibly contracted] personnel and utilizing third country specialists. . . . To improve the intelligence capacity of the DNII [the Uruguayan Dirección Nacional de Información e Inteligencia], U.S., or, if possible, third country agencies should provide training.²⁰

Latin American Actors in the Inter-American System

Anticommunist actors in the region were quite willing to accept US largesse to fortify their rule (or oust progressive leaders) and quell the rising tide of demands from newly politicized social sectors. The “internal enemies” doctrine targeted legal social movements, leftist political parties, elected leaders, activists, and dissidents, as well as insurgents, all of which were perceived to threaten existing configurations of political and economic power. It is important to see that the right-wing reaction, including Condor, was not solely a response to guerrilla movements. The record shows that the counterinsurgents greatly feared the possibility of *elected*

leaders who would pursue a nationalist or leftist agenda through constitutional channels.

That fear of elected leaders is well illustrated by declassified documents detailing discussions between Richard Nixon and Brazilian military dictator Emílio Garrastazu Médici in December 1971.²¹ The two like-minded leaders plotted to undermine or overthrow leftist and progressive leaders throughout the hemisphere via covert operations that would hide the hand of the United States. Nixon told Médici that “there were many things that Brazil as a South American country could do that the U.S. could not”—implying that Brazil could act on behalf of Washington—to undermine leftist leaders in Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Cuba, and Peru, all of which they discussed. Médici proposed that Brazil and the United States collaborate to stop the “trend of Marxist and leftist expansion,” and Nixon pledged to “assist Brazil when and wherever possible,” specifically with funds and resources to undermine the leftist government of Salvador Allende in Chile. Médici told Nixon that Brazil was working with Chilean officers to overthrow Allende (this was two years before the 1973 coup), and Nixon responded that it was “very important that Brazil and the United States work closely in this field” so that they could “prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to reverse these trends.”²² The two agreed to set up a secret back channel for communications (to prevent unauthorized persons from reading explosive top-secret exchanges and avoid a paper trail), and Nixon said that he would appoint Henry Kissinger as his liaison.

These documents, released in August 2009, provide new evidence of the ways in which powerful anticommunist leaders conspired to sabotage elected progressive governments promoting social change in the region. Brazil was clearly willing to use “the threat of intervention or tools of diplomacy and covert action to oppose leftist regimes, to keep friendly governments in office, or to help place them there in countries such as Bolivia and Uruguay,” as a secret 1972 CIA National Intelligence Estimate put it.²³ Significantly, one concerned Brazilian general told a CIA contact that he thought “the United States obviously wants Brazil to ‘do the dirty work,’ ”²⁴ thereby expressing internal qualms about Brazil’s expanding role as Washington’s surrogate in subverting Latin American governments. Despite such occasional reservations, however, the Brazilian

military played a major role as a counterrevolutionary actor in the region. Such forms of cooperation laid the groundwork for Operation Condor.

In 1973 or early 1974, before the apparatus acquired its code name and formal structure, the counterinsurgents created the prototype of Operation Condor, a coordinated system for disappearing, torturing, and illegally transferring exiles across borders.²⁵ Between 1973 and 1975, cross-border disappearances and forcible, extralegal transfers of exiles (“renditions”) by multinational squadrons commenced under an unwritten agreement enabling the associated militaries to pursue individuals who had fled to neighboring countries. This was the essence of Condor, as yet unnamed. Chilean colonel Manuel Contreras, head of Chile’s Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), was a key Condor organizer. He called for a founding meeting to institutionalize the Condor prototype in 1975. In 2000 the CIA acknowledged that Contreras had been a paid CIA agent between 1974 and 1977, a period when the Condor network was planning and carrying out assassinations in Europe, Latin America, and the United States.

In Argentina, Perón himself apparently mandated Argentine participation in the Condor prototype. Evidence suggests that he authorized joint cross-border operations before his death in July 1974. A declassified US document noted that

Perón authorized the Argentine Federal Police and the Argentine intelligence to cooperate with Chilean intelligence in apprehending Chilean left-wing extremists in exile in Argentina. Similar arrangements had also been made with the security services of Bolivia, Uruguay, and Brazil. This cooperation among security forces apparently includes permission for foreign officials to operate within Argentina, against their exiled nationals. . . . This authority allegedly includes arrest of such exiles and transfer to the home country without recourse to legal procedures . . . [and includes] the formation of paramilitary groups to act extralegally against the terrorists, including the utilization of abduction, interrogation, and execution.²⁶

In 1974 a Uruguayan abduction-disappearance squadron took up residence in Buenos Aires, where it worked with its Argentine and Chilean counterparts to seize, torture, interrogate, and illegally transfer exiles (many of whom had protected status with the United Nations) to their home countries. Selected Uruguayan navy units began to coordinate secret repressive actions with personnel from the notorious Argentine Navy Mechanics School (ESMA) in 1974, and an ESMA delegation traveled to Uruguay that year to train officers in torture techniques in counterinsurgency courses.²⁷ Later, Condor officers in Argentina used an abandoned auto repair shop, Orletti Motors—code-named OT [Operaciones Tácticas] 18—as a secret torture and detention center for foreign detainees. Survivors reported seeing Bolivians, Chileans, Uruguayans, as well as two Cuban diplomats, imprisoned and tortured there. Orletti was under the operational control of the Argentine intelligence organization *Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado* (SIDE), which reported to the top commanders of the Argentine dictatorship.

In August 1975, organizers of the eleventh Conference of American Armies held a preliminary planning meeting in Montevideo, and in October the inter-American military summit took place in that city. These secret conferences were a major venue for secret planning among the army delegates, including Condor operations. Conferences had “mandatory themes” including “The Establishment of a Communications Net to Transmit and Exchange Information on Subversive Movements” (1963); “Administration of Training and Intensifying Preparations of Armies in Revolutionary Wars” (1964); “Communist Subversion in the Americas/Democratic Education and Instruction on Fighting a Revolutionary Battle” (1969); “Strategies Against Subversion in the Americas for the Security of the Hemisphere” (1973); and “Psychological Warfare Guarantee from Member Armies Not To Permit Subversive Elements From Other Countries to Operate in Their Country” (1981).²⁸ The theme for the 1975 conference was “Rules of the CAA [Conference of American Armies] and Integral Education System in the Americas (To Contribute to the Eradication of Subversion).”

The commander of the Uruguayan Joint Chiefs, Luis Queirolo, saluted his “grand nucleus of friends and comrades in arms” at the preparatory conference and lauded the unified mission of the militaries, proclaiming that

“the only thing separating us is our uniforms, for the men of the armies of America, I believe, have never before understood one another as we do at this moment. . . . There exists a coordination among the armies of the continent to combat and impede Marxist infiltration or whatever other form of subversion.”²⁹ General Julio Vadora—Uruguayan army chief, president of the 1975 conference, and a Condor commander—gave a fiery speech at the October session and, significantly, endorsed “the regional integration” of the armed forces. He added, “Marxist theories have no place, with their class struggles, generational confrontations, conflicts between owners and workers, just as there is no place for violence, hate, lies, and corruption, breaches of authority, anarchy, illiteracy, misery or hunger. The armies are the instruments of national integration.” A 6 November memo from the Uruguayan Embassy in Santiago about the army conference noted that the de facto civilian president of Uruguay, Juan María Bordaberry, had given a speech as well.³⁰ Bordaberry had dissolved Congress and cooperated with the military to close down Uruguay’s democracy and institute a civil-military dictatorship in 1973.

Between 6 and 12 October, the Conference of Intelligence Commanders took place in Uruguay’s Hotel Carrasco, and on 29 October the Conference of Commanders in Chief was held. Here Manuel Contreras of the Chilean DINA launched his proposal for institutionalizing the Condor prototype. He circulated an agenda, dated 29 October, and a recommended structure for the transnational repressive alliance and called for a formal founding meeting in Santiago in November. Contreras noted in his invitation that previous combined operations had taken place on the basis of “gentlemen’s agreements” and that more permanent, sophisticated structures were needed. Contreras’s proposal reflected the apocalyptic language of the national security doctrine:

Subversion, for some years, has been present in our Continent, sheltered by politico-economic concepts that are fundamentally contrary to History, Philosophy, Religion, and the traditions of the countries of our Hemisphere. This described situation recognizes no Frontiers or Countries, and the infiltration penetrates all levels of National life. . . . It is to confront this Psycho-political War that we have deter-

mined that we must function in the international environment not with a command centralized in its internal functioning, but with an efficient Coordination that will permit an opportune interchange of intelligence and experience as well as a certain level of personal relations among the chiefs responsible for Security.³¹

At the Santiago meeting military delegations from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed what was essentially the charter document of the Condor organization. (Brazil, with observer status, became a full member soon afterward.) The original proposals were adopted, a coordinating structure and encrypted communications system organized, and security procedures agreed upon. The participants pledged to initiate “rapid and immediate contact when an individual was expelled from a country or when a suspect traveled in order to alert the Intelligence Services” of the other Condor countries. Point 5G of the agreement recommended installing intelligence operatives in each country’s embassies, where they would be fully accredited and, moreover, would be in a position to monitor and control Condor operations. Point 5L stated that the “present organism is denominated CONDOR, approved unanimously in conformity with the motion presented by the Uruguayan delegation in honor of the host country.”³²

In recent years much documentation has been discovered in the Paraguayan police’s “archives of terror,” in Uruguayan, Argentine, Chilean, and Brazilian archives, and in declassified US files on the growing collaboration among the militaries, their shared hatred of and alarm at the “subversive threat,” and their regular intelligence meetings in the 1970s. The Paraguayan archives include lists of thousands of persons—including children—suspected to be subversives, and thousands of photos of “seditionists,” many from neighboring countries. Lists of Chileans, Uruguayans, Brazilians, and Bolivians exiled in Misiones Province, Argentina, filled one police file. Some photos carried a red slash and the handwritten words “Muerto” or “Capturado.”³³

An August 1975 intelligence report discovered in Uruguay in 2006, written by notorious Uruguayan Condor operative Colonel José Gavazzo, further documented Condor operations. Gavazzo had always denied

involvement in Condor despite being identified by numerous survivors of Orletti. The report confirmed his role as a key Condor commander as it discussed intelligence gathered on the activities of revolutionary groups, including the Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria, and persons from Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay, and reported on the abductions of some of them in Argentina.³⁴ Gavazzo was also implicated in cables from 1976 released in Uruguay in 2009. The decoded cables between “Condor 1” (Argentina) and “Condor 5” (Uruguay), were marked “Secret-Very Urgent” and conveyed requests for intelligence about suspects. Gavazzo signed one cable as “Jefe de CONDOROP” (Chief of CONDOROP).³⁵ Journalist Roger Rodriguez noted that the acronym was in English (CONDOROP) rather than Spanish (OPCONDOR) and wondered whether it reflected the covert US role in Condor.³⁶ These cables were turned over to the Uruguayan courts in 2009.

Another series of intelligence reports, written by Condor officer Enrique Arancibia Clavel—Chilean DINA agent and torturer stationed in Argentina during the 1970s—showed the massive toll of military extermination efforts. He reported:

Attached is a list of all the deaths during the year 1975. The list is classified by month. It includes the “official” deaths as well as the “unofficial.” This work was done by Battalion 601 of Army Intelligence located at Callao and Viamonte, which depends on *Jefatura II de Inteligencia* of the General Command of the Army. The lists correspond to annex 74888.75/A1.EA. and annex 74889.75/id. Those that appear NN are those whose bodies were impossible to identify, almost 100% of which correspond to extremist elements eliminated by the security forces extralegally. There are computed 22,000 between dead and disappeared from 1975 to the present.³⁷

Thousands of exiles from many countries were under threat in each of the Condor countries and beyond. In August 1977, for example, the UN Human Rights Commission representative said she had placed under UN protection some fifty refugees in Rio de Janeiro, most of them Argentine,

and sent them to third countries.³⁸ In another case, an Argentine living in Rio reported to the UNHCR that he had been kidnapped by a group of Brazilians and Argentines and tortured with electric shocks in an unknown location before being released.³⁹ In 1979 Bolivian human rights leaders said there were hundreds of Bolivians missing as a result of “repressive coordination” among the South American dictatorships, and they specifically cited Operation Condor.⁴⁰ The Condor regime was lethally effective—due, in no small measure, to covert US assistance.

US Involvement in Condor

Washington acted as a secret partner and sponsor of Condor, particularly during the Nixon and Ford administrations. A number of declassified documents show that top US leaders and national security officials considered the Condor system an effective and valuable weapon in the hemispheric anticommunist crusade. The strategic concept of Condor as a covert special operations force fit neatly within US unconventional warfare doctrine. One military analyst defines special operations as “unorthodox coups . . . unexpected strokes of violence, usually mounted and executed outside the military establishment of the day, which exercise a startling effect on the enemy: preferably at the highest level.”⁴¹ Such operations are conducted “outside the normal legal conventions governing war,” as one analyst delicately put it.⁴² Another defines a special operations force in terms of its “strategic utility” in providing “significant results with limited resources” and having a “disproportionate impact” as a force multiplier, thus “expanding the options of political and military leaders.”⁴³ A fourth asserts that Special Operations Forces have large roles in three key missions: preemptive action, domestic counterterrorism, and unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare includes “a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations . . . conducted by, with, or through indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, equipped, supported and directed by an external source.”⁴⁴

Many declassified US documents of the time referred to Condor in favorable language. One 1976 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report noted that a Condor assassination unit was “structured much like a U.S. Special Forces Team,” and matter-of-factly described Condor’s “joint

counterinsurgency operations” to “eliminate Marxist terrorist activities.”⁴⁵ Military and CIA cables reported on secret Condor operations, including the forced disappearance of dozens of members of the Uruguayan Partido de la Victoria del Pueblo (PVP) in Buenos Aires in 1976, indicating close relations with key Condor hunter-killer units.⁴⁶ In this case, the Uruguayan army tried to camouflage the PVP disappearances with a psychological operations campaign, claiming that the exiles had returned to Uruguay clandestinely in a planned “invasion” of the country. Colonel Gavazzo and other Condor officers staged a spectacular fictitious capture of the disappeared and tortured activists, bringing them from secret detention centers in Uruguay to local hotels and then ostentatiously parading them before the press, with large numbers of weapons that they said belonged to the PVP members.⁴⁷

The CIA provided telex machines and, later, state-of-the-art computers to the Condor system, coding and decoding devices, and other technology, while US security agencies provided intelligence cooperation, including lists of suspects. Declassified documents show that US personnel were directly involved in some Condor abduction-disappearances and “renditions.” The Rettig Commission of Chile learned, for example, that the capture of Chilean militant Jorge Isaac Fuentes Alarcón in Paraguay was a cooperative effort by Argentine intelligence services, personnel of the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, and Paraguayan police.⁴⁸ In another case, Argentine Condor operative Leandro Sánchez Reisse, testifying before a congressional subcommittee in 1987, stated that there was a central inter-American intelligence body called the Intelligence Advisory Committee that included delegates from the Latin American intelligence services as well as the CIA and the DIA. This body apparently discussed individuals who were considered political enemies and threats in the region; some of them disappeared.

In recent years the attorneys of Condor operatives in both Chile and Argentina have argued before judges that the tactics of torture, abduction, terrorism, and sabotage used in the dirty wars were legitimate and lawful under the existing military governments and part of authorized military doctrine and training. The lawyer for Chilean Condor torturer Miguel Krassnoff asserted in 2004, for example, that “the State instructed” Chilean officers to use such methods and that therefore his client should not be

held accountable. He went so far as to show military manuals to the court as evidence—and to argue that army doctrine at the time drew directly from counterinsurgency techniques elaborated in the United States and taught in the School of the Americas. In 2005 an Argentine lawyer made an identical argument before a court on behalf of his clients, thirty dirty war officers, including General Santiago Riveros (a Condor commander). He cited passages from an Argentine army manual on psychological warfare that referred to the use of torture, sabotage, threats, and kidnappings.⁴⁹ In 2009, when the manual in question was made public, retired Argentine colonel Horacio Ballester, president of the Center of Military Men for Democracy, said that it seemed to be a direct translation of a US manual used in the School of the Americas during the Cold War.⁵⁰

There was an even more stunning indication of covert US collaboration with the Condor apparatus: Condor units operated from the major US military base in the Panama Canal Zone. The base was the regional counterinsurgency center, often serving as a platform for US intervention in Latin American countries. The site hosted some fourteen US military installations at the time, including the School of the Americas, the headquarters of the Southern Command, bases for the four armed services, and a large CIA station. Moreover, Condor officers were granted authorized access to the US continental communications system housed at the base.

A Paraguayan general told Ambassador Robert White in 1978 that Condor agents used “an encrypted system within the U.S. telecommunications net[work]” on the base, which covered all of Latin America, to “coordinate intelligence information.”⁵¹ White immediately linked the operation to Condor. The base’s powerful communications capability gave Condor agents the ability to monitor, track, and seize individuals across a vast geographical area—and demonstrated deep US engagement and involvement with the Condor system. The provision of a top-secret, encrypted, dedicated channel for communications on an important US base indicates that the Condor network was considered a high-risk, highly classified black operation that served the interests of Washington. As I have argued previously, this degree of US involvement is one of several crucial pieces of evidence that Condor was a top-secret component of the continental counterinsurgency regime, sponsored and led by Washington.

As the US government, the regional hegemon, facilitated the militarization of Latin America, it also supplied crucial sustenance to the Condor organization that functioned covertly within the inter-American system.

Analyzing Contingent and Structural Factors

Washington perceived a threat to its hegemony in Latin America, and its anticommunist partners in the region also feared popular protest and movements demanding structural change. The developing world was viewed as the key battleground in the East-West conflict, and the US government interpreted any challenge to US orientations and its preferred form of market capitalism to be subversive, whether nationalist, social democratic, or even neutralist. At the same time, traditional elites and conservative military officers in Latin America were alarmed by the rise of social mobilization within their countries.

During this era Latin American and US military and political elites made calculated decisions to bypass legal methods in order to demobilize societies and eliminate potential, or actual, power contenders. Brutal methods were considered legitimate, even noble, in a zero-sum struggle with “subversion.” As Brian Loveman points out, in some countries secret police had resorted to practices like torture in earlier eras. But during the counterinsurgency period torture, disappearance, extrajudicial execution, and assassination became institutionalized, and human rights crimes became widespread. The creation and use of parastatal forces and structures instilled dread and fear within broad populations, disorienting and disarticulating them. The systematic use of death squads and mass “disappearances” appeared first in Guatemala in the 1960s, part of a counterinsurgency strategy encouraged by US advisors. Indeed, death squads appeared in several countries where US police training programs were largest in the 1960s and ’70s: in Guatemala, Brazil, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic.⁵² These squads were parallel forces created and used by states as counterinsurgency tools. As local elites sought to preserve or increase their wealth and power they often chose alignment with Washington as their best option, at times even opportunistically inflating the threat of “communism” to win US backing.

There was a convergence of interests in preempting radical or even social democratic alternatives to the prevailing politico-economic systems. The Condor system was perceived to have “strategic utility” and to be cost effective. Washington had helped to create the environment for unconventional warfare and covertly facilitated Condor’s formation and its subsequent operations. It is unlikely that the Latin American military states themselves could have constructed, or perpetuated, such a sophisticated continental hunter-killer program as Condor without Washington’s political, technological, and intelligence resources. US sponsorship served as a link among the Latin American countries, and Washington was a key proponent and enabler of anticommunist repressive operations across the region. Conversely, US opposition to such hemispheric death squad operations could have greatly weakened or stopped them, given the substantial support and sustenance (e.g., the Panama communications network) that Washington was providing. This observation is important because it locates Condor within the system of hegemonic power relations at the time, and it highlights the key role that Washington played in the production and perpetuation of particular patterns of political violence.

The continent’s militaries were united in a “holy war” against subversion during the Cold War. US forces worked to deepen this unity of interests and ideology within the inter-American security institutions and through the strategic use of enormous resources to provide incentives and threats. Many of the militaries embraced the messianic role and new national powers provided by the counterinsurgency regime. Challenges to elite rule would be met lethally, lawlessly, and brutally, outside of previously recognized limits. Condor was a black operation within the counterinsurgency effort, and it had a powerful supporter.

Longitudinal Comparisons: Changing Historic Blocs and Structures

In the early twenty-first century, however, survivors of the dirty wars had ascended to the presidencies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, and leftists also governed in Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Preventing this scenario had been a crucial goal of Washington’s hemispheric policy during the Cold War. How can this

change be explained? True, most of these new leaders deliberately cultivated a moderate stance and avoided the more radical policies embraced by Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and a few others. It was also true that US policy and military resources were focused on wars in the Middle East. But it seemed clear that Washington's previous hegemonic influence and its model of world order had weakened in Latin America. Moreover, *Condor* had a beginning and an end. Why? It is not enough to observe that Latin Americans were now exercising agency in new ways and choosing leaders, and new paths, that diverged from Washington's preferences. To understand *how* and *why* this situation came about we must also look to changing structural factors and the rise of counterhegemony in the region.

First, much information had emerged documenting Washington's links to military coups and dictatorships during the Cold War. Such information tarnished the reputation of the United States in the eyes of many Latin Americans, as did the US obsession with drug trafficking and other security-oriented agendas after the end of the Cold War. Second, the US-sponsored economic model of free-market neoliberalism had been challenged in Latin America, in a gradually cumulative process, since the 1980s. During the 1980s and '90s the linkage of discredited military regimes with neoliberal economic policies; the debt crisis; the policies of structural adjustment; the overbearing role of the IMF and World Bank; the increasing poverty and inequality in Latin America; the collapse of social welfare programs and public institutions such as schools and hospitals; the financial meltdowns in several key countries: all of these developments led to widespread rejection of "the Washington consensus" in the region. Masses of people, sectors of the media, political organizations, and other social forces pushed back against the existing model of power relations, which was impoverishing large majorities, and over time succeeded in challenging it. Leaders who had aligned themselves with that consensus were defeated (or ousted through "people power," as in Ecuador and Argentina). New leaders were elected who rejected the neoliberal model and acted to redirect state resources domestically, to a greater or lesser extent. In short, the Cold War model of repressive military rule coupled with internationally linked free markets entered into crisis in the 1980s and '90s in the region and gradually became delegitimized. While poverty and inequality, and new forms of violence, persisted, Latin America provides

an example of the power of popular movements' ability to not only confront structural systems of power, but also to alter them over time. As the structural conditions shaped by US hegemony in the hemisphere entered a state of flux, new opportunities arose for Latin Americans to choose alternative paths, which had been closed to them earlier. Counterhegemonic movements were further strengthened by significant public rejection of the George W. Bush administration's "War on Terror," its doctrine of preemption, its invasion of Iraq, and its lawless methods, which many of the world's people condemned.

Global structures were changing as well. With the "unipolar moment" that began with the collapse of the USSR, an ascendant force in US politics—the neoconservatives—had urged that the country move to assume world dominance and prevent the rise of any other power.⁵³ They also pushed relentlessly for an invasion of Iraq and the establishment of US hegemony in the Middle East. But this hegemonic project created new countermovements. Much of the world rejected the preemptive incursion into Iraq and condemned the methods used in the so-called War on Terror. The United States entered a crisis of legitimacy under the Bush administration and became increasingly isolated politically. The severe financial crisis and recession that began in 2007 cost Washington and its dominant model of structuring global economic relations even more credibility. These developments signified a gradual shift in global power structures that was still unfolding as this chapter was being written. As the US politico-economic model entered into crisis, new opportunities opened for less powerful states to stake independent positions and pursue independent policies. The "unipolar moment" seemed to be ending as new power centers emerged in the world in opposition to US policies.⁵⁴

Moreover, human rights norms and institutions had grown stronger internationally since the end of the Cold War. The 1990s saw many advances in the global human rights regime, including the arrest of General Pinochet under the principle of universal jurisdiction, and the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). After the terrible toll of the dirty wars, important sectors of the Latin American public were pro-democracy and very much aware of human rights issues. Many Latin American states, in an impressive show of defiance toward the Bush administration, refused to sign bilateral agreements exempting US personnel from the

ICC's jurisdiction, even when Washington threatened to cut off military aid (and did). Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Uruguay withdrew their officers from SOA training programs. Ecuador closed the US military base at Manta. When Colombia entered Ecuador in 2008 in a preemptive strike against Colombian guerrillas, its action was roundly condemned by Latin American leaders and the OAS—despite support for Colombia from the United States. In August 2009, all the Latin American presidents strongly opposed a US-Colombia plan allowing US military forces access to seven military bases for operations in that country and for continental counter-drug operations that used to be based in Manta. In short, Latin American leaders were challenging US policies and defining their own agendas in new ways. Opposition had assumed a critical mass, leading to new configurations of power or, in Cox's terms, a counterhegemony. Such expressions of independence—even when risking US threats and penalties—signaled important changes in overarching structures and power relations as well as new forms of agency.

Latin America thus reflects the dynamic interaction between structural and contingent factors. Rising challenges to central pillars of existing power relations led to the emergence of a new configuration of power in the hemisphere. Washington became relatively weaker and unable to impose its preferred model in the region. As the US-dominated political-economic global order (or historic bloc, in Cox's terms) entered a crisis of legitimacy, new possibilities for Latin American agency emerged, and Latin Americans seized them to pursue their own interests, even if defying Washington's preferences.

Even the security forces of the region changed to some extent. There were still intransigent elements within the region's military, police, and intelligence institutions (as well as within US forces). The mystique of elite units operating outside the law continued to appeal to some military sectors. But the militaries were wary of the Bush administration's attempts to promote the War on Terror as an all-encompassing continental mission and paradigm, similar to Cold War national security doctrine, and essentially they refused to accept US pressure to adopt it.

In short, power relations between the United States and Latin America were less asymmetrical than before, due to the changed configuration of social forces, institutions, ideologies, economic relations, and norms.

Key actors were choosing *not* to align with US interests and agendas as changing structural conditions opened new opportunities to pursue national interests. All these developments suggested that any sort of reconstitution of a Condor organization in Latin America was unlikely in the contemporary historical moment. Latin Americans were very aware of the horrors of the past, and they wanted to lead the way in the struggle for truth and justice so as to prevent future dirty wars and future Condors. The rejection of Washington's security paradigm in the region had real consequences. Large movements of people had effects in terms of shaping new structures and making alternative choices. Latin America well illustrates the insight that not only do structures affect the decisions of actors, but actors can change structures, or create new ones.

Conclusion

The question of structural and contingent factors is a complex one. During the Cold War era the latitude for contingent choices available to Latin American leaders and movements within the prevailing structures was quite restricted. US policymakers made deliberate decisions to back leaders in Latin America whose main assets were anticommunism and a pro-US orientation, and to oust leaders who challenged US policy preferences. Hemispheric structures drew the armed and intelligence forces together in an anticommunist mission with extensive repercussions in the region. Military and civil-military governments of the era employed vicious repression and worsened social stratification and inequality. Condor was formed within this convergence of Cold War interests, ideas, and institutions. Elites made strategic choices, calculating—within the matrix of threats and incentives from Washington—that extralegal forms of violence were the most efficient way to preserve their power and crush opposition. Condor was judged to have “strategic utility”—that is, its benefits outweighed its costs. While such elite decisions were not inevitable, there were powerful forces at work that shaped the options available to Latin American leaders in military and security matters.

This line of reasoning suggests that the specific type of organized violence represented by Condor was a contingent phenomenon having much to do with structural conditions, including US objectives and methods in

the region, the hemispheric counterinsurgency regime, and the correlation of forces at the time. A Cold War historic bloc existed, to use Cox's terms. The Cold War hegemonic structure was a prism through which most elites interpreted events. Labor strikes, peasant protests, and student demonstrations were all considered signs of communist subversion, even though many of the militant movements targeted by repressive governments were demanding more democracy, more inclusion, and more social equality. These were legitimate demands that governments could have accommodated. The problem was the overarching military-political structure and its accompanying ideological assumptions, which "internationalized" what were actually domestic conflicts. That historic bloc has undergone transformation since the 1980s.

Understanding the specific forms of state-sponsored violence represented by Operation Condor thus requires a perspective blending system and state levels and a dynamic understanding of the reciprocal interaction between structures and contingent choices. As Cardoso and Faletto argue, this sort of analysis avoids "the two fallacies frequently found in similar interpretations: a belief that the internal or national socio-political situation is mechanically conditioned by external dominance; and the opposite idea that all is due to historical contingency."⁵⁵

During the Cold War the United States, as the hemispheric hegemon, was able to shape a historic bloc and strongly influence the economic, political, and military directions of Latin American countries, in many cases inducing them to accept US preferences. In Cardoso and Faletto's terms, Washington, aided by its Latin American allies, employed specific mechanisms and processes of domination to maintain existing structures of wealth and power in the hemisphere.⁵⁶ Condor represented a powerful new structure that generated new patterns of violence and had a far-reaching impact upon thousands of people. Yet Condor came to an end when new divisions appeared between Washington and Latin American governments and when new international institutions and social forces (both local and international) began to publicly denounce and act against the repression. The actors involved in the Condor system eventually opted to disengage. Clearly, the operation's costs had reached the point of overshadowing its benefits. Condor effectively became dormant in the early 1980s in South America—although the Condor model was transplanted

to Central America by Condor officers, where it functioned throughout the 1980s.

New Condor-like systems of illicit violence could possibly be resurrected, although the prospects seem slim at this historical moment in Latin America. The counterweight to such a development is rooted in human agency: aware and active people and organizations, informed by historical memory, that oppose parastatal forces and extremist security doctrines and act to forestall them through law, through education, through organized action, and through strengthening the powers of democratic domestic and international institutions.

NOTES

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- 3 For a nuanced perspective, see the introduction to *When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies of Terror*, ed. Cecilia Menjivar and Néstor Rodríguez (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005).
- 4 It should be noted that Cox and Cardoso and Faletto place large emphases on production relations and economic development, respectively, while my analysis here adapts their concepts to analyze primarily political-military developments. This chapter draws on a 1998 paper of mine, which also used Cox’s framework. See McSherry, “The Argentine Military-Security Forces in the Era of Globalization: Changes and Continuities,” International Congress, Canadian Association for Latin American and Caribbean Studies/Canadian Association for Mexican Studies, Vancouver; Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55; republished with a postscript in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); see also Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
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- 6 Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependency and Development*, x.
- 7 Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependency and Development*, x–xi.

- 8 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
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- 12 See, for example, Alfred McCoy, *A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2006); Christopher Simpson, *The Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945–1960* (Berkeley, CA: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- 13 See Michael McClintock, “American Doctrine and Counterinsurgent State Terror,” in *Western State Terrorism*, ed. Alexander George (New York: Routledge, 1991): 121–54; Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism, 1940–1990* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), especially chapter 2.
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- 15 Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics,” 308.
- 16 “Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Activation, Organization and Training of the 2nd Ranger Battalion – Bolivian Army,” 28 April 1967, www.gwu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB5/che14_1.htm (accessed 23 November 2007).
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- 18 Fred J. Pushies, Terry Griswold, D. M. Giangreco, and S. F. Tomajczyk, *U. S. Counter-Terrorist Forces* (Minneapolis, MN: Crestline Imprints, 2002).
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- 20 Department of State, Secret Airgram, To State Department, From U.S. Embassy, Montevideo, “Transmission of a Preliminary Analysis and Strategy Paper – Uruguay,” 25 August 1971, p. 17.
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- 23 CIA, National Intelligence Estimate 93-72, Secret, “The New Course in Brazil,” 13 January 1972.

- 24 Secret CIA Memorandum, "Alleged Commitments Made by President Richard M. Nixon to Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazu Médici," n.d.
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- 28 The 1981 theme is interesting, since it was a major Condor function. See Spanish website for the Conferences of American Armies, <http://www.redcea.org/CycleInformation.aspx?Language=1&Cycle=11&Type=Mandatory> (accessed 15 June 2006).
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- 34 Copy of the report in author's possession. See Walter Pernas, "La autoincriminación de José Gavazzo en la Operación Cóndor," *Brecha* (Montevideo), 30 June 2006; Stella Calloni, "Gavazzo fue figura clave en la Operación Cóndor en Argentina," *La Jornada* (Mexico), 25 June 2006.
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- 40 US Embassy in La Paz, to Secretary of State, "Concern over Bolivian 'disappeared' in Argentina and Chile," 18 October 1979.
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- 42 Brailey, "Transformation," 20. This author is an advocate of Special Forces operations. He cites, for instance, the role of Special Forces Mobile Training Teams in El Salvador in the 1980s as an example of great success.
- 43 C. Gray, "Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations Succeed?" *Parameters* no. 2 (Spring 1999), cited in Brailey. "Transformation."
- 44 US Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, cited in K. D. Dickson, "The New Asymmetry: Unconventional Warfare and Army Special Forces," *Special Warfare* (Fall 2001): 16–17.
- 45 Defense Intelligence Agency, "Special Operations Forces," US Army, Defense Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC), 1 October 1976.
- 46 Defense Intelligence Agency, "Special Operations Forces."
- 47 A defector from the Uruguayan Servicio de Información de Defensa (Defense Intelligence Service) testified to this black operation. See "Declaraciones de Julio Cesar Barbosa Pla: Ex Integrante del SID," nd (1977?). Obtained by author in Buenos Aires from Argentine Commission on Historical Memory, 2005. See also McSherry, *Predatory States*, 122–25.
- 48 Fuentes Alarcón was seized by Paraguayan police as he crossed the border from Argentina to Paraguay in May 1975. Fuentes, a sociologist and a leader of the Chilean revolutionary group Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, was traveling with Amílcar Santucho, a brother of the leader of the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo of Argentina. Fuentes was transferred to Chilean police, who brought him to Villa Grimaldi, a notorious DINA detention center in Santiago. He was last seen there, savagely tortured. A declassified letter from the US Embassy in Buenos Aires (written by Robert Scherrer) informed the Chilean military of Fuentes's capture and provided the names and addresses of three individuals residing in the United States whom Fuentes had named during his interrogation. The letter stated that the FBI was conducting investigations of the three. This letter, among others, confirms that US officials and agencies were cooperating with the military dictatorships and acting as a link in the Condor chain.
- 49 Jorge Escalante, "Defensa de Krassnoff dice que el Ejército le enseñó a torturar," *La Nación* (Santiago), 15 September 2004; Marcos Taire, "El Ejército fue instruido para el secuestro, el terrorismo, la tortura y el asesinato," *ARGENPRESS*, 11 March 2005.
- 50 Adriana Meyer, "Un manual para represores," *Página/12*, 26 July 2009. Riveros was convicted in August 2009.

- 51 See secret “Roger Channel” cable from Ambassador Robert White to Secretary of State, “Second Meeting with Chief of Staff in Letelier Case,” 13 October 1978, <http://foia.state.gov/documents/StateChile3/000058FD.pdf> (accessed 7 February 2001); see also Diana Jean Schemo, “New Files Tie U.S. to Deaths of Latin Leftists in 1970s,” *New York Times*, 6 March 2001.
- 52 Michael Klare and Nancy Stein, “Police Terrorism in Latin America: Secret U.S. Bomb School Exposed,” *NACLA Latin America and Empire Report* 8, no. 1 (January 1974): 21.
- 53 See, for example, the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance of the first Bush administration, prepared by neoconservatives in Secretary of Defense Cheney’s office, which was leaked to the media. Many of the neocons assumed strategic positions in the Bush II administration and fiercely advocated the invasion of Iraq.
- 54 For more analysis of these events, see John Ehrenberg, J. Patrice McSherry, José R. Sánchez, and Caroleen Marji Sayej, *The Iraq Papers* (Berkeley, CA: Oxford University Press, 2009).
- 55 Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependency and Development*, 173.
- 56 Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependency and Development*, x.

PART II

